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I. Introduction
Family law deals with the regulation of the most sensitive
relationships in our lives—those between wives and husbands,
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between parents and children, and between people who share a
household. Family law regulates entry into family status
relationships, such as marriage, and the ways to get out of them,
such as divorce. It regulates the ongoing nature of those
relationships including duties, obligations, rights, and privileges
vested in the members of a family by virtue of their relationships
with one another.1
Generally, state domestic relations law balances two distinct
and opposite ends of liberty interests, both of which are of
paramount importance to the state: the preservation of family
privacy and the protection of individual members of a family. The
competition between these two positions has been highlighted in
the wake of Roe v. Wade.2 Family law has experienced some
dramatic changes in the forty years since this landmark decision.
The ease of obtaining a divorce has increased,3 while the
statutory requirements for entering into marriage are undergoing
alteration,4 and more individuals are opting out of marriage in
favor of cohabitation.5 Parenting rights and duties have changed,
1. Other large aspects of family law include property distribution, spousal
support, and child custody, but as those areas seem to have minimal interface
with abortion, they are not discussed in this article.
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (balancing the right to
privacy in the familial context, which encompasses a woman’s decision on
“whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,” against the legitimate state
interest of protecting maternal health and protecting “potential” prenatal life).
Roe has highlighted the competing interests of individual rights and family
interests by sometimes potentially setting family members against one another.
This Article seeks to set forth how Roe has possibly worked to increase conflicts
between husbands and wives, and between parents and children, but also how
those potential conflicts alter the interests of the family as a unit, drawing the
state into those intimate family relationships.
3. See Jonathan Gruber, Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The
Long-Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce, 22 J. LAB. ECON. 799, 799 (2004)
(using forty years of census data to confirm that unilateral divorce regulations—
involving laws that do not require explicit consent from both partners to obtain
a divorce—significantly increase the incidence of divorce).
4. For a review of the changing nature of requirements for entering into
marriage, from federal and state regulation to litigation, see generally Mark
Strasser, Windsor, Federalism, and the Future of Marriage Litigation, 37 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 23–28 (2013), http://harvardjlg.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/Strasser_Windsor_Federalism_and_the_Future_of_Marriage_L
itigation.pdf.
5. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Why Marriage Is Still the Best Default in
Estate Planning Conflicts, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1219, 1243 n.129 (2013)
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and rights and privileges of children have been altered.6 This
article examines whether, how, and why any of those changes are
related to Roe.
Roe’s effects on these matters of family law warrant review.
Part II begins with a discussion of changes to the parent–child
relationship since Roe v. Wade. It investigates the regulation of
parenting rights, duties, and choices, and the liberty interests of
children to receive loving and valued parenting, using both
statutory code and popular jurisprudence. Part III considers the
changes in marriage since Roe. This Part examines marriage
rights and privileges, focusing on how spousal roles are different
than they were prior to Roe. Relationships between members
within a household, sexuality regulation, and judicial decisionmaking in family law generally are the focus of Part IV. Finally,
Part V offers some conclusions as to Roe’s effect on family law.
Forty years after Roe, alterations to family law include an
expansion of the concept of increasing individuality and a
contracting sense of community, and both are at least somewhat
connected to abortion rights and regulations.7 This Article seeks
(discussing Census data indicating that a significant and growing percentage of
the U.S. population comprises unmarried households).
6. See generally Mary Ann Mason, The Roller Coaster of Child Custody
Law over the Last Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWS. 451 (2013)
(citing Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the
Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. FAM. STUD. 337 (2008)).
7. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
TRADITION: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987) (contrasting
American individualism with the European emphasis on community to proffer
that the legal tradition in the United States, since abortion jurisprudence (and
divorce reform), has become more individualistic by incorporating the “right to
be let alone” and viewing individuals as “lone rights bearers”). In Katherine
Bartlett’s review of Glendon’s book, she characterizes Glendon’s view of the
intrafamily conflict that abortion laws have created between a mother and her
child:
Glendon focuses on the contrasting symbolism of the American and
European approaches: while American abortion law reflects the
triumph of women’s liberty rights over a nonperson/fetus, abortion
law in other Western nations communicates a message of active
societal concern for fetal life along with compassion for the pregnant
woman and a commitment to minimizing the impact of her “tragic
choices.”
Katherine T. Bartlett, Story Telling, 1987 DUKE L.J. 760, 761 (reviewing
GLENDON, supra note 7) (citations omitted). These ideas are developed further in
Part III of this Article.
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to demonstrate that these alterations to family law and
jurisprudence have generally affected the family as an
institution. This expansion and contraction in family law as a
whole has included seismic shifts in fundamental foundations of
familial relations from what were previously understood,
particularly between spouses, between parents and children, and
between women and men.8 While all those changes are not
necessarily a direct result of Roe, the decision’s influence is
undeniable.
II. Roe’s Effects on the Parent–Child Relationship
Historic recognition of broad parental authority to raise
children made the family the basic social, economic, and political
unit.9 Historically, parental rights were understood in property
terms, and parents possessed virtually unlimited control over
their offspring.10 Parents were presumed to be protectors of their
children’s best interests.11 The state had an interest in the
8. Professor David Smolin has considered some of these shifts in human
relationships brought on by abortion law in a jurisprudential context. See David
M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 975, 980–83 (1992) (analyzing Supreme Court abortion and
homosexuality jurisprudence and determining that a faction of the Court erred
in creating “certain implicit constitutional understandings about the
relationship between government and the family”). Smolin analyzes that
jurisprudence in terms of the conflict between a woman and her fetus and the
State, which may wish to protect either of them. Id. at 1015. He also looks at
women’s reproductive freedoms as compared to men’s and the connection
between abortion jurisprudence and parental rights, noting the “elevation of
abortion to a virtually super-protected right and the simultaneous rejection of
claims based on parental control over birth and education.” Id. at 1015. These
notions are also developed further throughout this Article.
9. See David Wagner, The Family and American Constitutional Law, 1
LIBERTY, LIFE & FAM. 145, 157–67 (1994) (discussing this historical basis in the
context of the development of individualism through American constitutional
case law); Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L.
REV. 605, 613–19 (1976) (discussing the history of and concerns with the
parents’ rights versus children’s rights conundrum).
10. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 225 (3d ed. 1995)
(“Historically, parental . . . power over offspring until the age of majority . . . was
all but unlimited and unchecked.”).
11. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of
the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337,
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preservation of family strength and privacy.12 When Roe legalized
the right to abortion, these notions were changed, revising the
parent−child relationship in completely new ways and removing
parents from the equation when abortion was involved as a choice
for a child.
New laws affecting the parent–child relationship were
developed, at least somewhat, in response to Roe.13
Pennsylvania’s laws to protect the parent–child relationship
when making a choice about abortion, among other laws
regulating the abortion right, were challenged in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.14 While
upholding Roe’s basic right to abortion, Casey found laws that
restricted abortion, such as those requiring informed consent,
minimum requirements for clinical facilities providing abortion,
and parental notification for minors seeking abortions to be
constitutional.15 Based on the privacy and liberty interests
founded in Roe, new notions, albeit of much more limited
parental involvement in a child’s abortion, became significant.
Many state and federal restrictions on abortion in the United
345−52 (2008) (tracing the history of the best interest standard as related to
parental rights).
12. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship,
and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 463, 493–94 (1983) (noting that the Supreme Court recognized the state’s
interest in formal marriage because of the importance society places on family).
13. See Steve Alumbaugh & C.K. Rowland, The Links Between PlatformBased Appointment Criteria and Trial Judges’ Abortion Judgments, 74
JUDICATURE 153, 157 (1990) (noting that “state legislatures have passed
hundreds of laws designed to circumvent or limit the scope and breadth of” Roe,
including a number of provisions that impact familial relationships, including
spousal consent and parental consent laws). For a summary of state attempts to
regulate abortion in the era following Roe, see ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY
WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 997–1006 (3d ed. 1995).
14. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)
(describing several Pennsylvania state laws, all of which were passed after Roe
was decided).
15. See id. at 899 (upholding a law permitting minors to obtain an abortion
only after receiving parental consent or, in special cases, court approval). The
Court struck down a requirement for spousal notification. See id. at 895–98
(explaining why the state may not require a husband’s approval for his wife to
have an abortion). For a review of how Casey brought abortion liberty and
regulation to a head, see generally Lynne Marie Kohm & Colleen Holmes, The
Rise and Fall of Women’s Rights: Have Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom
Forfeited Victory?, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 381 (2000).
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States were in place before Roe.16 Because Roe was relatively
silent as to a minor’s abortion decision, an inference could be
drawn that Roe permitted abortion on demand for a minor child
without the protection that family involvement provides.17
Pennsylvania’s response was to establish a law designed to
protect the best interests of a child through a parent’s
involvement in his or her child’s abortion decision.18 Montana
16. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 72–80 (2005) (describing those
restrictions in place prior to Roe); Stephen P. Rosenberg, Note, Splitting the
Baby: When Can a Pregnant Minor Obtain an Abortion Without Parental
Consent? The Ex Parte Anonymous Cases (Alabama 2001), 34 CONN. L. REV.
1109, 1109 (2002) (describing how the Supreme Court refused to answer the
question of parental involvement in Roe, effectively mandating that states fill
the regulatory gap if they wanted parents involved in the abortion decisions of
their children).
17. Roe seems to offer implicit approval for the availability of abortion on
demand for a minor child (without mention of parental involvement). See
Charles E. Rice, Abortion: What Did the Supreme Court Do in Roe v. Wade? 5−6,
in LIFE & LEARNING IX, http://www.uffl.org/vol%209/rice9.pdf
According to Roe, even after viability, when the state may regulate
and even prohibit abortion, the state may not prohibit abortion
“where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.” The health of the
mother includes her psychological as well as physical well-being. And
“the medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—
relevant to the well-being of the mother.” This is equivalent to a
sanction for permissive abortion at every stage of pregnancy.
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). These statements from Roe and Doe,
analyzed here by Professor Rice, intimate that the age of the woman seeking the
abortion is relevant to her wellbeing, permitting abortion on demand for a
woman of any age if her wellbeing is at issue. See also Gary-Nw. Ind. Women’s
Srvcs., Inc. v. Bowen, 421 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (where pre-Roe
provisions of the Indiana Abortion Law requiring parental consent were held to
be unconstitutional). “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights.” Id. at 736. The separate concurring statement of District Judge Allen
Sharp draws the position of a minor’s right to abortion on demand during the
first trimester into better focus. “[O]ur highest Court has now vested in a
mother, regardless of age or parental or marital consent, the absolute right to
terminate human life in a clearly identifiable form during the first three months
of its existence . . . .” Id.
18. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(a) (2013) (mandating parental
involvement in a minor’s abortion decision via an informed consent
requirement). This law states:
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passed legislation specifically noting that parental involvement
serves a child’s best interests.19
Other states have responded to the opportunity presented by
Casey with regulatory schemes that fall into three categories:
those protecting parental consent,20 those requiring parental
notification,21 and those schemes that mandate both notification
Except in the case of a medical emergency, or except as provided in
this section, if a pregnant woman is less than 18 years of age and not
emancipated, or if she has been adjudged an incapacitated person
under 20 Pa.C.S. § 5511 (relating to petition and hearing;
independent evaluation), a physician shall not perform an abortion
upon her unless, in the case of a woman who is less than 18 years of
age, he first obtains the informed consent both of the pregnant
woman and of one of her parents; or, in the case of a woman who is an
incapacitated person, he first obtains the informed consent of her
guardian. In deciding whether to grant such consent, a pregnant
woman's parent or guardian shall consider only their child’s or ward’s
best interests. In the case of a pregnancy that is the result of incest
where the father is a party to the incestuous act, the pregnant woman
need only obtain the consent of her mother.
Id.
19. MONT CODE ANN. § 50-20-502 (2013) (noting that “parents ordinarily
possess information essential to . . . [support a] physician’s best medical
judgment,” that parents can ensure that their children receive “adequate
medical care” after an abortion, and that “parental consultation is usually
desirable and in the best interests of the minor”). The Montana Legislature
stated that the “purpose of this part is to further the important and compelling
state interests of . . . protecting minors against their own immaturity” and
“fostering family unity,” as well as “preserving the family as a viable social
unit.” Id.
20. Parental consent laws can be found in ALA. CODE § 26-21-3 (2013); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-803 (2013); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-609A (2013); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 656705 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (LexisNexis 2013); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (2013); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 722.903(1) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53 (2013); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 188.028(1) (2013); MONT CODE ANN. § 50-20-504 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 716902 (2012) (requiring written notarized consent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.7(a)
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121
(LexisNexis 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(a) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303 (2013);
WIS. STAT. § 48.375 (2012).
21. Parental notification laws can be found in ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.16.020(a)(1) (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-37.5-104 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 1783(1) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 390.01114 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11682 (2014); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/15 (2013); IOWA CODE § 135L.3 (2014); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (LexisNexis 2013); MINN. STAT. § 144.343
(2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:33 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7
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and consent.22 These laws largely protect a parent’s intercession
in his or her child’s abortion decision, but challenges to these
laws have continued since Casey because of Roe. For example, in
July of 2013 the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
Illinois Parental Notification Act of 1995, following thirteen years
of litigation over whether underage young women may gain the
protection of notification of a parent before undergoing an
abortion.23 The court held that the “[s]tate has a strong and
legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose
immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes
impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely.”24
Family law in this area of parent–child relations has gone
from unconstrained parental rights to the emergence of new
rights for children against their parents (because of Roe) and
parents against their children (in Casey). Roe has positioned
children and parents against each other, breaking down this
important family relationship, while also developing an entirely
new area of family law.
Counter-balanced against parental rights restricted by Roe is
the enlargement of the mature minor doctrine, which since Roe
has expanded a child’s privacy and liberty interests.25 Generally
(2013); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (2013).
22. State laws mandating both parental notification and parental consent
include OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §1-740.2 (2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002 (West
2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-304, -304.5 (LexisNexis 2013); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-241 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118 (2013).
23. See Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 991 N.E.2d 745, 769 (Ill.
2013) (holding that the law does not violate “state constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection”); Naomi Nix, Illinois Supreme Court Backs
Parental Notification for Abortions, CHI. TRIB. (July 13, 2012), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2013-07-11/news/chi-abortion-parental-notification-201307
11_1_illinois-supreme-court-said-lorie-chaiten-parental-notifica tion (last visited
Jan. 2, 2014) (reporting on the central holding of Flores and responses to the
ruling by pro-life and pro-choice advocacy groups) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
24. Flores, 991 N.E.2d at 767 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990)).
25. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 451–52 n.49 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“The ‘mature minor’ doctrine permits a child to consent to medical
treatment if he is capable of appreciating its nature and consequences.”). In his
dissent in Matheson, Justice Marshall discussed the two positions taken by the
Justices after Roe on whether “mature” minors had a sufficient privacy interest
in their abortion decisions to invalidate parental notification laws. See id.
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within family law, states defer to parents who are the legal
authority to make decisions regarding the medical treatment of
their children.26 However, many jurisdictions have carved out an
area of law that permits minors to statutorily determine their
own medical treatment if that minor is mature enough and
individually competent, according to a judge’s discretion, to
understand the possible risks and benefits of the proposed
medical procedure.27 Much of this privacy jurisprudence was
developed in case law prior to Roe.28 Shortly after Roe, the United
States Supreme Court determined that, as a matter of
constitutional law, a mature minor must be permitted to make
her own decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.29 The
(outlining Justice Powell’s position that notification statutes were constitutional
if they provided individualized determinations of the decision-making capacity
of the mature minor, and Justice Steven’s position that such judicial
determinations unconstitutionally infringed on the mature minor’s privacy).
26. See PETER N. SWISHER, LAWRENCE D. DIEHL & JAMES R. COTTRELL,
FAMILY LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE AND FORMS § 5.5 (2013)
The general rule with medical . . . care for children is that the parents
ultimately decide whether medical care is to be provided for the child
and what that care is to be. This general rule, however, is not
absolute. The parents still owe their minor children the duty to
provide adequate medical care, or the parents may be guilty of child
abuse.
(providing that a failure to secure medical attention for an injured child is a
Class 1 misdemeanor, with a Christian Science practitioner exception (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-314 (2013))).
27. See Lois A. Weithorn, Developmental Factors and Competence to Make
Informed Treatment Decisions, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD AND YOUTH
SERVICES 85, 88 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1982) (enumerating the mature minor
exception and giving examples of applicable standards for “maturity” from
statutes and jurisprudence).
28. See Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Medical
Consent, 11 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 115, 117−20 (1973) (summarizing the case law
pertaining to consent to very basic medical care by a minor).
29. See Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (concluding that every
minor “must have the opportunity” for a court to determine whether they are
mature enough to make an abortion decision on her own without requiring
parental notification or consultation as a preliminary step); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72, 75 (1976) (holding unconstitutional consent
requirement for all unmarried minor abortions during the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy because it infringed on the “weighty” right to privacy possessed by
“competent minor[s] mature enough to have become pregnant”). Similarly, the
Court held in Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), that minors
cannot be denied access to contraceptives, both over the counter and medically
prescribed. Id. at 681–82.
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mature minor doctrine expanded rights for girls seeking an
abortion, but it has not necessarily been applied to boys in their
medical treatment decision-making.30 Others suggest that equal
protection of boys and girls with regard to mature minor laws
cannot be applied similarly to boys and girls because pregnancy
requires that an autonomous liberty interest be afforded to a girl
(because her body carries the child),31 which is unavailable to a
boy by virtue of procreative differences.32 Still others have argued
that the unborn children who are being illegally aborted deserve
the protection of counsel in the form of a court-appointed
guardian ad litem.33
Roe changed the parent–child relationship; the development
of the mature minor doctrine and parental notification and
consent laws, a response to Roe, also changed the relationship
between parent and child. These regulations brought about
parenting limits that provide for a child to judicially bypass her
parents to seek an abortion under certain circumstances.34 The
30. See, e.g., ‘Abraham’s Law’ Clears Virginia Senate Panel, 4 VA. MED. L.
REP. 18, 18 (2007), http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/VMLRJan2007.pdf
(discussing the origin of “Abraham’s Law,” the opposition to it, and the potential
harm to all children). A judge ordered a 16-year-old boy, Starchild Abraham
Cherrix, to take chemotherapy treatments to which he did not consent. Id.
Although an agreement was eventually reached between social services and
Abraham’s attorneys to prevent this forced chemotherapy, Abraham would have
been required to take the chemotherapy but for the agreement. Id.
31. See, e.g., Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Note, Where Privacy Fails: Equal
Protection and the Abortion Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 637–38
(1993) (noting the difficulty in applying traditional equal protection
jurisprudence to laws that classify on the basis of biological differences).
32. For a comprehensive review of the case law, see generally Martin
Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
589 (2002).
33. See Mark H. Bonner & Jennifer A. Sheriff, A Child Needs a Champion:
Ad Litem Representation for Prenatal Children, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
511, 554 n.216, 555 (2013) (arguing that “hundreds, if not thousands” of illegal
abortions could be prevented each year by the appointment of fetal guardians ad
litem and listing state statutes pertaining to parental consent to an abortion for
their minor child).
34. ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020(a)(2) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-804
(2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(2) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-682
(2014); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(d) (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(b) (2012); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3) (LexisNexis 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.5 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.903(2) (2013); MINN. STAT. § 144.343(6) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-53(3) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.028(2) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-
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lack of encouraging minors to consult with their own parents
before undergoing an abortion procedure shows the disjointed
nature of the parent–child relationship since Roe.35
The progression of the mature minor doctrine fostered
competing interests between children and parents not fully
contemplated before Roe. Professor Helen Alvaré suggests that
parents “ought to be reinserted in decisions about whether their
minor children will receive health care or even surgery in the
forms of contraception and abortion.”36 She argues that the law
“should stop indicating to minors that they are capable of gauging
the full effects of premarital sexual involvement, parenting or
abortion, without parental guidance.”37 By judicially removing
the parent and his or her love and guidance from the child in
certain circumstances, such as a stressful surgery like abortion,
the child may be placed in a dangerous situation without needed
support. Alvaré also argues that these new, additional laws affect
a child’s premarital sexual behavior, while also sending the
message that adolescents are competent to “discern their own
sexual values.”38 For example, judicial bypass laws allow a
pregnant minor seeking an abortion to convince a judge, whom
she is meeting for the first time, that she is mature enough to
6903 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.7(b) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.103.1(2) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121(C) (LexisNexis 2013); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3206(c) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-41-32 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4
(2013); WIS. STAT. § 48.375 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(b) (2013). Two
states provide for a physician waiver of the notice requirement: MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (LexisNexis 2013); and W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (2013).
Delaware, West Virginia, and Wisconsin allow a specified health professional to
determine a waiver of parental consent or notice. See State Policies in Brief: An
Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST., Feb. 1, 2014, at 3,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf
(providing
an
overview chart listing state policies).
35. For an overview of these laws by state, see State Abortion Laws: A
Survey, MSU.EDU, https://www.msu.edu/user/schwenkl/abtrbng/stablw.htm (last
visited Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter MSU State Abortion Law Survey] (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); State Policies in Brief: An Overview of
Abortion Laws, supra note 34, at 2–3.
36. Helen M. Alvaré, Saying “Yes” Before Saying “I Do”: Premarital Sex and
Cohabitation as a Piece of the Divorce Puzzle, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 7, 64 (2004).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 56.
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make her own abortion assessment.39 There is a large segment of
society that perceives this to be an infringement on their ability
to directly influence the upbringing of their children regarding
premarital sexual decision-making.40
Roe has also affected the parent–child relationship in terms
of child support. Roe introduced intent to become a parent as a
factor in assigning child support obligations and thereby gave
parents a rationale for avoiding responsibilities to their
children.41 Roe allows mothers to eliminate the obligation to
support children they did not intend to conceive but does not
extend the same ability to fathers.42 In reaction to this disparity,
fathers have advanced two main arguments rooted in the intent
to parent rationale to likewise avoid child support obligations.
The first type of argument draws from equal protection
jurisprudence,43 and the second relies on a fraud analysis.44
First, fathers posit a post-Roe dichotomy that, they argue,
constitutes a violation of equal protection: while a mother can
avoid all legal obligations of parenthood by having an abortion, a
father cannot avoid the legal obligation of child support, even
when the mother has the child against his wishes.45 Courts have
39. See id. (explaining how judicial bypass laws work and their prevalence).
40. See id. at 83 (“It is an understatement to conclude that parents likely
perceive weakening social support for communicating and enforcing teachings
on premarital sex to their children.”).
41. See generally Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Fifty Years Later, 42
FAM. L.Q. 365 (2008) (discussing child support in the abortion context); Sally
Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support
Obligations?, 66 MOD. L. REV. 175 (2003) (affording a rationale to exempt men
from child support in the context of abortion).
42. See Marshall B. Kapp, The Father’s (Lack of) Right and Responsibilities
in the Abortion Decision: An Examination of Legal–Ethical Implications, 9 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 369, 381 (1982) (arguing that Roe “reduced the father of a fetus to
the status of a helpless bystander,” and, consequentially, he should not be held
responsible for child support).
43. Infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
44. Infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
45. See Kapp, supra note 42, at 378–79 (“Where a man is forced to
discharge support obligations toward a child whom he did not anticipate or want
and over whose birth or personhood he had no control or responsibility, he may
justly claim discrimination.”). Shortly after Roe, the Alabama Supreme Court
rejected an equal protection claim against the paternity obligation of a man who
had offered to pay for an(other) abortion for his pregnant girlfriend when she
declined and later sued him for child support. See Harris v. State, 356 So. 2d

ROE’S EFFECTS ON FAMILY LAW

1351

universally rejected this equal protection argument, resulting in
this theory having no authority and little actual impact upon
family law regulation.46 It has, however, had some impact
informally in court as demonstrated by the mere fact that courts
have often been confronted with this argument.47 Although the
argument might make a modicum of sense logically, it would be a
family law defeat to see fathers escape their obligations to their
born children.48 What are not certain are the effects on children
and their relationship with their parent once this argument has
been made in court and the child becomes aware of it. It would be
detrimental in several ways to children everywhere were fathers
relieved of their obligations to their children.49
623, 624 (Ala. 1978) (rejecting the father’s equal protection argument to deny
any liability for the child). Harris, the father, contended that Alabama’s
paternity determination proceeding statutes “deny the father of an illegitimate
child equal protection of the laws.” Id. He argued that because Mary, the
mother, “did not consent to have an abortion when he requested her to do so,”
and because he agreed to pay for the abortion, he was “denied any decision as to
the birth of the child,” making him “not liable for the child’s maintenance, care
and education.” Id. The court held that the “decision not to have an abortion was
that of Mary Moore, and hers alone, and by not having one at the request of
Harris, Harris cannot now shirk his obligations to the child as required by the
statute.” Id. (concluding, based on Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, that there
were no “constitutional infirmities” in the paternity statutes and that a state
cannot give a husband a “veto” over his wife’s decision to have an abortion). The
premise of whether intent (to become a parent) is relevant for child support
obligations has come about because of Roe. This is because the law since Roe
allows mothers to eliminate the obligation (child), while not allowing that same
ability to fathers.
46. See Morgan, supra note 41, at 371 (“Courts have been unwilling to
accept an argument that the constitutional rights that a woman enjoys to
terminate a pregnancy also give men the right not to procreate.”).
47. See id. at 371 n.30 (compiling cases from six states in which fathers
attempted to argue equal protection claims based on a woman’s refusal to have
an abortion).
48. Some suggest that the law is logically unequal in this area. “[I]f
women’s partial responsibility for pregnancy does not obligate them to support a
fetus, then men’s partial responsibility for pregnancy does not obligate them to
support a resulting child.” Elizabeth Brake, Fatherhood and Child Support: Do
Men Have a Right to Choose?, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 55, 56 (2005) (arguing that at
most, men should be responsible for helping with the medical expenses and
other costs of a pregnancy for which they are partly responsible).
49. See Sheldon, supra note 41, at 188 (suggesting that, as a consequence of
relieving fathers of their obligations to their children, “[m]en would be
encouraged to become less involved in their families; abortion of potentially
wanted children would be encouraged; gendered [sic] disparities in wealth would
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Second, a child’s relationship with a father as expressed
through child support has been directly affected by Roe and its
progeny through the emergence of fraud and misrepresentation
arguments that arise as an extension of the significance Roe
implicitly attaches to the intent to become a parent. As described
by Melanie McCulley:
[P]utative fathers also have employed the claim or defense of
fraud and misrepresentation in paternity proceedings to avoid
their duty to pay support or to recover from the female
damages for the amount of the support awarded. The putative
father argues that the mother lied to him regarding her ability
to conceive or her use of contraceptives. Thus, the putative
father could not have agreed to become a father and should not
be made to pay support or should be allowed to recover
damages because his right to procreative choice or his right to
privacy has been violated.50

Courts unanimously have held that such claims or defenses are
against public policy.51 Whether or not this is fairness, or
equality, or good public policy is a matter of debate.52 Moreover,
be further entrenched; and child poverty would be exacerbated”). These points
are made not to argue that fathers should have the unilateral decision for an
abortion. Rather, they are made to draw out the concerns that are derived from
Roe with regard to fatherhood. Indeed, children today are affected by
fatherlessness. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA:
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 25–48 (1995) (summarizing
the impacts of fatherlessness, including its effect on youth violence, domestic
violence against women, child sex abuse, child poverty, and economic
insecurity). Whether the growing social problem of fatherlessness is connected
to Roe is a worthwhile discussion, but beyond the scope of this Article.
50. Melanie G. McCulley, The Male Abortion: The Putative Father’s Right
to Terminate His Interests in and Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 23 (1998).
51. See Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equality: A Father’s Right to
Pursue a Claim of Paternal Misrepresentation, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1065–
92 (2005) (compiling dozens of cases in support of the proposition that
misrepresentation claims, made in any form, have been “singularly
unsuccessful”).
52. Compare Erika M. Hiester, Child Support Statutes and the Father’s
Right Not to Procreate, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 241 (2004) (affording a
statutory overview and concluding that “[i]t is inequitable and unjust to force
responsibility on [a father] for the choices made by the mother of his child”), and
McCulley, supra note 50, at 56 (maintaining that “courts have erred in
systematically denying the putative father’s rights and in focusing their
analysis on the financial best interests of the child”), with Evans, supra note 51,
at 1108–09 (claiming that Griswold and Eisenstadt create an individual right to
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the desire by a father that his child be aborted is not harmless.
Children are inevitably impacted by the knowledge that their
parents did not want them.53
These instances reveal how the parent–child relationship is
harmed by nonsupport of the child by the parent. The question of
whether intent to become a parent is relevant for child support
obligations has become salient because of Roe.54 Roe granted
mothers an opportunity to eliminate the obligation to support
children they have conceived, and it prompted fathers to fight for
a comparable opportunity. The parent–child relationship is thus
harmed by nonsupport of the child by the parent. Whether the
pro-life movement, as one response to Roe, has supported efforts
to improve the collection of support payments from fathers as a
way to combat abortion by alleviating the financial pressure upon
women with unwanted pregnancies is a worthwhile question.
Despite some recent changes, the various devices for collecting
support payments are still woefully inadequate.55
procreate and, as a corollary, a “nondelegable obligation to protect against
unwanted procreation,” which justifies courts in rejecting fraud and
misrepresentation claims), and Andrea M. Sharrin, Potential Fathers and
Abortion: A Woman’s Womb Is Not a Man’s Castle, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1359, 1404
(1990) (emphasizing the autonomy differences between men and women in
reproductive choice and concluding that these differences do not provide a
“convincing basis for the creation of paternal rights that would operate to the
exclusion of the right to an abortion”).
53. Cf. Henry P. David, Born Unwanted, 35 Years Later: the Prague Study,
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, May 2006, at 181, 187 (studying 350 mothers who
did not want their children, noting that “in the aggregate, being born from an
unwanted pregnancy entails an increased risk for negative psychosocial
development and mental well-being (at least up to age 35, the end of the
study)”). The author further noted that when tested against a control group,
“the findings . . . lend at least partial support to the hypothesis that being born
from an unwanted pregnancy has longer-term negative effects” because “[t]he
unwanted pregnancy subjects became psychiatric patients (especially inpatients) more often than controls born from accepted pregnancies and also
more often than their older siblings.” Id.
54. Melanie B. Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood’s Influence: Rethinking
Procreative Autonomy and Federal Paternity Establishment Policy, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 489, 492 (2012) (“Inherent within the definition of
procreative liberty that embraces the freedom to have children or not [derived
from Roe] is the concept of intent . . . .”).
55. See Paula G. Roberts, Child Support Orders: Problems With
Enforcement, 4 CHILD. & DIVORCE 101, 103 (1994) (discussing low child support
collection).
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Roe has also had an impact on the parent–child relationship
with respect to adoption law. Increased abortion choices have
naturally shrunk the pool of newborn children available for
adoption.56 In considering the impact of Roe, it is helpful to bear
in mind not just what impact Roe has actually had but what
impact it should have had in the area of adoption law. With fewer
newborns needing an adoption placement, state services have
generally not worked to simplify and lessen the expenses of
adoption procedures.57
Another piece to this abortion–adoption puzzle has been the
rise of Safe Haven (or safe harbor) laws,58 in which states have
56. See Marianne Bitler & Madeline Zavodny, Did Abortion Legalization
Reduce the Number of Unwanted Children? Evidence from Adoptions, 34 PERSP.
SEXUALITY & REPROD. HEALTH 25, 25 (2002), available at
ON
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3402502.html (showing a sizable effect
of abortion on the decline in adoption rates, particularly revealing that abortion
legalization led to a reduction of “unwanted” children and of children available
for adoption).
57. See generally Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for Our Own: Why American
Adoption Law and Policy Must Change, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327 (1997)
(discussing the problem of adoption law complexity in several contexts).
58. Safe Haven laws are found in every state and in the District of
Columbia. ALA. CODE §§ 26-25-1 to -5 (2013); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.013, .990
(2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-34-201, 202 (2013); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7 (West 2013); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 271.5 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 17a-57, -58 (2012); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 902, 907–08 (2013); D.C. CODE
§§ 4-1451.01 to .08 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 383.50 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10A2 to -7 (2013); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 587D-1 to -7 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 39-8201 to -8207 (2013); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2/10, 2/15, 2/20, 2/27 (2013);
IND. CODE § 31-34-2.5-1 (2013); IOWA CODE §§ 233.1, .2 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-2282 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.190, 405.075 (LexisNexis 2013);
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1149–53 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tits. 17-A, § 553, 22
§ 4018 (2013); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-641 (LexisNexis 2013);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39 1/2 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 712.1, .2, .3, .5,
.20 (2013); MINN. STAT. §§ 145.902, 260C.139, 609.3785 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 43-15-201, -203, -207, -209 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.950 (2013); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-402 to -405 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-121 (2012); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 432B.160, .630 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132-A:1 to :4
(2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-15.6 to -15.10 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24-22-1.1, -2, -3, -8 (2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 260.00, .10 (McKinney 2013);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 372-g (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-500 (2012);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02, 50-25.1-15 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2151.3515, .3516, .3523 (LexisNexis 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-2-109
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.017 (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4306, 6502, 6504,
6507 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-13.1-2, -3 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-40
(2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-5A-27, -31, -34 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-
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approved statutes that allow babies to be abandoned in specific
locations if certain procedures are followed.59 Safe Haven laws
allow newborn babies to be abandoned at fire stations, doctors’
offices, and hospitals, without charging the abandoning parent
with any potential criminal liability for negligence or abuse.60
Rather than encourage a parent to place his or her child up for
adoption, Safe Haven laws provided a way for a parent to be
released from responsibility for his or her child, while
encouraging the protection of the child’s safety.61 Safe Haven
laws were also used as a political tool to discourage abortion,
given that they provided another option for women handling
unwanted pregnancies.62 Though not directly the reason for the
1-142, 68-11-255 (2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.301, .302 (West 2013);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-4a-801, -802 (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1303 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-226.5:2, 18.2-371.1, 40.1-103 (2013); WASH.
REV. CODE § 13.34.360 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 49-6E-1 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 48.195
(2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-11-101, -102, -103, –108 (2013).
59. Texas was the first state with such a law, named the “Baby Moses
Law,” in 1998; by 2008 all fifty states had some sort of safe haven type of law.
See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFANT
SAFE HAVEN LAW 1–2 (2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_
policies/statutes/safehaven.pdf (outlining the widespread adoption of safe haven
laws by all fifty states).
60. See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of
Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 753 (2006) (laying out how these laws relate to
pro-life political objectives).
61. See Susan Ayres, Kairos and Safe Havens: The Timing and Calamity of
Unwanted Birth, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 227, 227, 249, 278–79, 281
(2008) (noting that states passed these laws “in an effort to stem the problem of
neonaticide and illegal abandonment,” which could number into the hundreds
each year).
62. See Sanger, supra note 60, at 753 (arguing that, by enacting Safe
Haven laws, states are working to promote a “culture of life” that seeks the
ultimate reversal of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). From the indications
given in some commentary and based on some state experiences with the law,
Safe Haven laws arose to stem the rising tide of infanticide. See id. at 774–75
(describing the string of infanticides that were used to advance legislation in
various states); see also Lynne Marie Kohm & Thomas Scott Liverman, Prom
Mom Killers: The Impact of Blame Shift and Distorted Statistics on Punishment
for Neonaticide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 43, 56, 70–71 (2002) (citing
evidence indicating that “child homicide and infanticide rates continue to rise in
the United States,” and asserting that states have responded to this trend by
passing Safe Haven laws). Consider, for example, the experience in Nebraska,
where lawmakers neglected at first to insert into the law an age limit for the
surrendered child and found their state becoming a haven for troubled parents
to drop off their teen children. See Ed Lavandera, Nebraska Fears Rush to Drop
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development of Safe Haven laws, Roe’s jurisprudence may have
heightened the urgency of the underlying rationale that states
were worried about mothers killing newborn babies, as indicated
by the introduction of similar laws in France.63
Individuals from all political and legal views seem to agree
that Safe Haven laws are at least partly supported by political
ideology flowing from Roe v. Wade.64 These views fall into three
main areas. First, some think that Safe Haven laws are a result
of the “culture of life” movement that erupted after Roe.65 This
view proposes that Roe v. Wade has created a society that is
dismissive of the importance of life and asserts that Safe Haven
laws are considered part of the general “culture of life” movement
as an effort to guard children who may otherwise be dismissively
disposed of because of this culture.66 Second, some think that
Off Kids Before Haven Law Change, CNN (Nov. 8, 2008, 11:38 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/11/14/nebraska.safe.haven/ (last visited Jan. 6,
2014) (“Safe haven laws were meant to protect infants . . . . Safe haven laws
allow distraught parents, who fear that their children are in imminent danger,
to drop them off at hospitals without being charged with abandonment.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The connection between this
rationale and Roe may be tenuous, but it could be argued that Roe has devalued
the worth of a child, making a child more vulnerable to maltreatment, leading to
the initial conception of Safe Haven-type laws. This view is worth further
development but is essentially beyond the scope of this Article and its focus on
family law.
63. See Nadine Lefaucheur, The French “Tradition” of Anonymous Birth:
The Lines of Argument, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 319, 321, 329–30 (2004)
(explaining the French perception of their form of anonymous abandonment
laws as “saving children,” as these laws were designed to give women another
option besides abortion for unwanted pregnancies). But cf. Susan Ayres, Not a
Story to Pass On: Constructing Mothers Who Kill, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39
(2004) (considering whether legalized abandonment solves the problem of
neonaticide and newborn abandonment). It should be noted that the fact that
France acted to pass laws to limit infanticide because of concerns about abortion
does not necessarily mean, however, that American states did the same.
64. See Sanger, supra note 60, at 759 (noting that Safe Haven laws are
supported by the political rhetoric surrounding the abortion debate with broad
“coalitions of unusual bedfellows”).
65. See id. at 753 (arguing that Safe Haven laws are properly understood
within a larger political “culture of life” organized around “the protection of
unborn life,” and that Safe Haven laws ultimately work to promote the reversal
of Roe by “connecting infant life to unborn life and infanticide to abortion”).
66. See id. at 808 (“Safe Haven legislation serves as one more connecting
dot in a larger enterprise that seeks to blur the boundaries between prenatal
and postnatal life, contributing powerfully to the pro-life project by keeping
what is characterized as the murderousness of abortion in the public eye.”).
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these laws are an extension of the idea of reproductive rights for
women and hail Safe Haven laws as an additional way for
mothers to maintain privacy a result of Roe.67 This means that
rather than adopting the view that Safe Haven laws’ primary
rhetorical impact is reversing Roe v. Wade, they are “providing
women with another choice in their continuum of decisionmaking for unwanted pregnancies.”68 Third, some argue in an
interesting and distinct way that Roe has created a pro-women’s
rights atmosphere in Safe Haven laws that is too expansive,
cutting biological fathers out of the equation after birth; arguing
that Safe Haven laws disrespect paternal rights in a way Roe
never intended:
The rationale in Roe suggests that what happens to a child
once born cannot be subject to exclusive maternal control.
While potential fathers cannot participate much in decisions
on prenatal care, nor on pregnancy termination, a father can
fully participate in childrearing once a child is born. In fact,
under prevailing public policies, a father typically merits an
equal opportunity to rear children, such that unilateral
decision making by a mother cannot be tolerated.69

More saliently, Safe Haven laws are advanced with the
political rhetoric of Roe in the context of parents being relieved of
obligations to their children, something that traditionally occurs
in the context of adoption placement. As part of a domestic
67. See Brittany Neal, Reforming the Safe Haven in Ohio: Protecting the
Rights of Mothers Through Anonymity, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 347, 370 (2012) (“Much
like Roe protects the right to have an abortion, a woman’s right to safely
surrender her baby to medical experts, without another individual interfering
with her decision, is crucial in a woman maintaining her due process right to
privacy.”).
68. Ayres, supra note 61, at 278.
69. Jeffrey A. Parness & Therese A. Clarke Arado, Safe Haven, Adoption
and Birth Record Laws: Where Are the Daddies? 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 207, 235–236
(2007); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Deserting Mothers, Abandoned Babies, Lost
Fathers: Dangers in Safe Havens, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 335, 347 (2006)
Yet, notwithstanding their pre-birth abortion rights under Roe v.
Wade, women have never generally possessed veto powers over the
childrearing interests of genetic fathers of children born alive, at least
where the women are unwed genetic mothers whose pregnancies
resulted from consensual sexual intercourse. Such maternal powers
are “foreign to our legal tradition.”
(citation omitted).
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relations regulatory system, Roe has assisted in the addition of
new laws that have affected the parent–child relationship.
Roe’s influence has also stretched into other laws that
negatively impact the parent–child relationship. The value of a
child, not from an economic standpoint but from an intrinsic
standpoint, is reflected in a proliferation of litigation over the tort
of wrongful birth. Consider “medical malpractice claim[s] brought
when a physician’s negligent care leads to the birth of a child
with a congenital illness or abnormality that the parents would
have chosen to abort had they been given appropriate prenatal
counseling and information earlier in the pregnancy.”70 Because
the “result of genetic testing may lead a woman to terminate her
pregnancy,” these tests open “a flood of moral and philosophical
issues.”71 To prevail in a wrongful birth claim, parents must
establish that they have been harmed by the birth of their child,
an element which is “likely the most controversial and
philosophically difficult aspect of the wrongful birth action.”72
Rare before Roe, abortion protection has led indirectly to a
proliferation of this litigation.73
The wrongful birth tort action is lauded by pro-choice
advocates on the basis that it “ensures that doctors will exercise
due care in prenatal counseling and provide parents with the
information necessary to make informed procreative decisions,”
particularly toward abortion.74 Some states, however, notably
those that have gravitated toward increased abortion regulation
70. Julie Gantz, State Statutory Preclusion of Wrongful Birth Relief: A
Troubling Re-Writing of a Woman’s Right to Choose and the Doctor–Patient
Relationship, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 795, 796 (1997) (discussing the
circumstances of residents of Pennsylvania, “one of six states whose legislature
has determined that women have no cause of action against their doctors if, but
for the lack of correct genetic information, they would have chosen abortion
rather than continue the pregnancy”).
71. Id. at 808.
72. Id. at 815 (“There are two views on what constitutes harm: 1. the
absence of choice in reproductive decisions; and 2. the birth of an impaired
child.”).
73. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Judging Genetic Risks: Physicians Often Caught
Between What Patients Want and What Science Offers, AM. MED. NEWS (Nov. 10,
2008), http://www.amednews.com/article/20081110/profession/311109973/4 (last
visited Jan. 6, 2014) (noting that “case law in about 25 states recognizes
wrongful birth claims”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. Gantz, supra note 70, at 806.
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and greater protection for fetal life, have passed legislation to
prohibit wrongful birth actions.75 Other states have protected
fetal life in their case law, as in Hamilton v. Scott,76 in which the
Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed “that the lives of unborn
children are protected by Alabama’s wrongful-death statue,
regardless of viability.”77 It makes sense that support for the
wrongful birth tort tracks with support for abortion, for the action
adopts a pro-choice or pro-abortion view of the unborn child,
dependent on recognition that a mother’s autonomy absolutely
overrides any rights of the child regardless of its moral status.78
Of course, as a legal remedy, the wrongful birth action not only
depends on a pro-choice rationale but it is also impacted by Roe’s
holding, as without abortion as a legal and justifiable option, the
tort would be impossible. Wrongful birth has led to depreciation
of the parent–child relationship and of children.79
75. See Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability
for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risk, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 159–60 (1992) (noting
that these states banned the cause of action because they were persuaded that
prenatal diagnosis of genetic conditions “encourages abortion”); Gantz, supra
note 70, at 818–19 (noting that wrongful birth actions are explicitly barred by
statute in several states—Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Utah—and implicitly barred in North Carolina by a conscience
clause that the state supreme court has interpreted to preclude the legal theory
of wrongful birth).
76. 97 So. 3d 728 (Ala. 2012) (maintaining a wrongful death action for the
death of an unborn child who died before he was viable).
77. Id. at 737 (Parker, J., concurring specially). Justice Thomas Parker’s
special concurrence in this case set forth why Roe v. Wade did not bar the result
the court reached as Roe is not controlling authority beyond abortion law,
emphasizing “the diminishing influence of Roe’s viability standard.” Id.
78. See Gantz, supra note 70, at 808–09 (stating that a “wrongful birth
action recognizes a woman’s right to choose abortion and compensates her when
that liberty is denied by the act or omission of a doctor failing to meet the
standard of care” (citation omitted)). Gantz argues that “[w]rongful birth
liability protects women from pro-life doctors imposing their own moral views on
their patients.” Id. Gantz also offers some interesting comments on how Roe has
affected other areas of society, to the point of suggesting that pro-life OB/GYNs
are in the wrong profession. See id. at 810 (noting that such doctors are “quite
possibly in the wrong specialty”). Freedom of conscience for the medical
professional is nearly nonexistent in that “[w]ith the wrongful birth action
available, the pro-life obstetrician has no legal choice but to put aside his
personal views and provide his patients with the information they need to
decide whether to undergo genetic screening.” Id. at 811.
79. See Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 176 (2005) (focusing on
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In great contrast to the tort of wrongful birth is the
development in criminal law of fetal homicide laws. Laws
criminalizing intentional or negligent harm to fetal life have
continued to develop post-Roe.80 Legislation designed to punish
violence against pregnant women, protect unborn life, and to
punish its taking was stimulated, at least somewhat, by the lack
of protection for unborn life brought about under Roe.81 Roe
created an obstacle that barred the states from protecting fetal
life, as states would have done (and indeed did do) without Roe.82
Fetal homicide laws became an avenue of state protection of
unborn life as a consequence of Roe.83
Finally, consider what message a government sends to its
citizens about the value of a child when it endorses, as a
fundamental right, a parent’s choice to kill a child, albeit unborn.
The very person a child is most dependent upon prior to birth and
for a good many of the first years of life is also the one by which
he or she can be placed in the most jeopardy. The Supreme Court
in 1973, even if unwittingly, severely devalued children generally,
and by their closest relatives specifically, with its ruling in Roe.
how the tort devalues disabilities and the unborn children that are challenged
with them).
80. See Jennifer A. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of
Violence Act in North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 140 (2006) (offering that,
in the aftermath of Roe, “a majority of jurisdictions, both state and federal, have
now successfully enacted and sustained fetal homicide laws”). See generally
Mark S. Kende, Michigan's Proposed Prenatal Protection Act: Undermining a
Woman’s Right to an Abortion, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 247 (1996) (examining
Michigan’s Senate Bill 515, which criminalizes “virtually any injury to a fetus”
without regard to intent but which provides a “medical exception” designed to
comport with Roe and Casey, as an attempt to limit abortion rights).
81. See Luke M. Milligan, A Theory of Stability: John Rawls, Fetal
Homicide, and Substantive Due Process, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1188–92 (2007)
(discussing the juxtaposition that Roe created, the inquiries prompted by fetalhomicide laws, and a mother’s exemption from them).
82. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 78 (describing the laws struck down
by the Court in Roe).
83. See Michael Holzapfel, The Right to Live, The Right to Choose, and the
Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 431, 439
(2002) (“According to Planned Parenthood, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act is
designed solely with the intent of eroding the very foundation of Roe v. Wade.”).
But see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 723–24 (2006) (supporting the notion that fetal homicide
laws have passed as a result of Roe, but that those “laws are not uniformly
hostile to the landmark decision”).
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These areas of the mature minor doctrine,84 child support
disputes,85 safe haven laws,86 wrongful birth tort actions,87 and
fetal homicide laws all work to reveal a landscape of laws that
owe their development to Roe. These areas of legislation have
affected and harmed the parent–child relationship and the value
of the child in the four decades since the decision.
III. Roe’s Effects on Marriage and the Spousal Relationship
Roe disallowed many state and federal restrictions on
abortion throughout the United States.88 Its holding was
reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, which became the source of invalidating spousal
notification requirements.89 States like Pennsylvania began to
work post-Roe to protect the welfare of citizens in light of the
legality of abortion by developing various statutory parameters
for the exercise of that right within the Roe framework.90 The
Justices in Casey were tasked with reviewing the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s regulations on abortion;91 they
determined that the only unconstitutional portion in the law was
that of spousal involvement in a woman’s right to an abortion.92
84. Supra notes 25–40 and accompanying text.
85. Supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text.
86. Supra notes 56–69 and accompanying text.
87. Supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text.
88. See William Mears & Bob Franken, 30 Years After Ruling, Ambiguity,
Anxiety Surround Abortion Debate, CNN (Jan. 22, 2003, 2:53 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/21/roevwade.overview/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2014) (reporting that Roe and its companion case “impacted laws in 46 states”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (saying Pennsylvania’s spousal notification
was “an undue burden, and therefore invalid”).
90. See id. at 946–50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing various state
regulations implemented after Roe).
91. See id. at 844 (plurality opinion) (describing the provisions of the
Pennsylvania law at issue).
92. See id. at 880, 895 (concluding, respectively, that Pennsylvania’s
definition of medical emergency did not violate Roe, and that the spousal
notification requirement constituted an unconstitutional undue burden). See
generally Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the
New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 77–83
(1995) (describing Casey’s path to the Court, its holdings, and public reaction to
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The marital relationship was altered when the Court ruled that
there could be no requirement of spousal notification of
abortion.93 Rather than promoting marital harmony, the Court
pushed a wedge between the husband and the wife. The Court
raised the issue of disharmony in the marital relationship as
justification for seeking an abortion, as a reason a woman would
be unable to discuss the matter with her husband, but also
effectively thwarted any right of the husband to communicate
with his wife on the matter of the unborn child or of the
marriage.94 The autonomy set out in Roe served as spousal
distancing in Casey.
Marital communication has historically been important to
the Supreme Court of the United States.95 It rendered the
common law doctrine of marital privilege regarding confidential
communications between spouses constitutional.96 Reflecting the
significance traditionally ascribed to marital communications,
even in the years since Roe when spousal notification
requirements were outlawed,97 ten states still carry on their
books unenforceable laws requiring spousal consent or notice.98

it).
93. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (ruling that Pennsylvania’s spousal
notification law was an undue burden).
94. See id. at 892 (discussing studies that found “marital difficulties” to be
“the primary reason women do not notify their husbands” when the husband is
the father). The Court noted that a strong marriage would not need a spousal
notification law, as spouses would certainly discuss important decisions such as
that of abortion. Id. at 892–93. Rather, the Court focused on the need for
freedom from spousal notice or consent in marriages characterized by abuse or
cruelty. Id. at 893.
95. See, e.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (recognizing that
confidential communications between spouses are privileged for evidentiary
purposes); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1839) (outlining the doctrine
of the marital communications privilege).
96. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (recognizing the
existence of a federal evidentiary privilege for confidential communications
between spouses).
97. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)
(striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal notification law).
98. See MSU State Abortion Law Survey, supra note 35 (listing Colorado,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Utah as retaining spousal notification laws).
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Lack of communication is often cited as a primary source of
marital breakdown and subsequent dissolution.99 What role Roe
has had in the proliferation of divorce is a more complex matter.
Divorce prior to the late 1960s was generally available for causes
of action based on fault by one of the parties.100 The fault of the
perpetrating spouse was considered a breach of the marital
promise or agreement, and thus victim spouses could sue for
divorce based on the damage caused by the other spouse’s fault.101
Many states also had bilateral no-fault divorce laws based on the
married parties’ consent to living separate and apart for a
lengthy period of time.102 In the early 1970s, however, divorce
laws in many states began to change with a nation-wide sweep
toward no-fault divorce, a phenomenon that is commonly called
the divorce revolution.103 The proliferation of no-fault divorce
laws provided for unilateral action and occurred largely after
1972, correlating chronologically with the Roe decision.104 The
99. See Ailsa Burns, Perceived Causes of Marriage Breakdown and
Conditions of Life, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 551, 553 (1984) (finding that lack of
communication was the second most frequently reported reason for marital
breakdown).
100. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum,
1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 83 (identifying pre-1969 divorce grounds on the basis of
fault).
101. See id. at 86 (discussing the idea of fault as “breach of marital trust”).
102. See William E. McCurdy, Divorce—A Suggested Approach, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 685, 701 (1956) (describing the state of divorce laws from the nineteenth
century through the 1950s).
103. See, e.g., LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 20–51 (1985) (describing the trend toward no-fault divorce in the
1970s).
104. See Wardle, supra note 100, at 97, 137 n.220 (citing to the research of
Doris Jonas Freed and her many articles on the development of divorce grounds
in the fifty states). In 1969, eight states had no-fault grounds for divorce. Id. at
138. That number rose to thirty-three in 1973 and forty-three in 1977. Id. By
1987, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of nofault divorce. Id. For an overview of each state’s code on divorce, including nofault grounds, see Grounds for Divorce and Residency Requirements, 46 FAMILY
L.Q. 530, 530–533 fig.4 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/family_law_quarterly/vol46/4win13_chart4_divorce.authcheckdam.
pdf (providing that all fifty states, including the District of Columbia, have
adopted some form of no-fault divorce). See also generally Denese Ashbaugh
Vlosly & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of No-Fault Divorce Laws in the
50 States, Families and the Law, 51 FAM. REL. 317, 317−24, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3700329.
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increase in divorce rates among the American population also
correlates chronologically with Roe, but is generally thought to be
more connected to the no-fault divorce revolution when the
American divorce rate more than doubled.105 A reasonable
inference could be made that disagreements between husbands
and wives as to whether accessing the right to an abortion could
be either a part or a whole reason for some divorces, but a causal
connection cannot be clearly established.
Comparisons between abortion rights and divorce
opportunities, however, are instructive here. Professor Mary Ann
Glendon’s comparative law work in abortion regulation and
divorce law observes that abortion has been less regulated in the
United States than anywhere in the western world, while at the
same time divorce laws among the states have been “less
diligent . . . to mitigate the economic casualties of divorce” to
family members comparatively than have other western
nations.106 She seems to attribute these connections to special
American traits, or factors that might have facilitated a uniquely
American approach to divorce and abortion.107 Professor Glendon
summarizes her assertions in that “political and legal ideas have
played no small part in forming the distinctively American way of
imagining the individual in his or her relationships to others in
the family and larger communities.”108 Similarly, Professor Helen
Alvaré discusses the notion of a more egocentric, adult-centered
approach to marriage that “view[s] marriage as more of a selfseeking than a self-giving institution, and thus steer[s] marriage
and families in a direction precisely opposite that which is needed
105. See Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the
American Family, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 165 (2006) (offering an empirical look
at the impact of no-fault divorce laws on marriage and divorce in America). See
generally Gruber, supra note 3.
106. See GLENDON, supra note 7, at 2, ch. 2 (discussing these phenomena
and the restrictions placed on divorce in other western nations).
107. See id. at ch. 3 (discussing an individual rights approach that
dominates American legal thinking with marital breakdown potentially working
to disadvantage the family unit left impoverished by divorce). Professor
Catharine MacKinnon also analyzes the privacy basis of abortion as an
individual right in American jurisprudence. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
Privacy vs. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 102 (1987). Professor MacKinnon’s analysis is
most relevant to and discussed further infra Part IV.
108. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 7.
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to reconnect these institutions to children and to the larger
society.”109 Considering the resulting effects of this individual
focus on marriage with the insight that Professors Glendon and
Alvaré offer is significant. The movement toward individualism
can be perceived in the embargo of spousal notice in abortion
through the way it affects marital oneness and communication.
Though abortion availability without spousal notice may not be a
direct cause of increased divorce rates, an argument can be made
regarding the individual liberty interests common to both
opportunities of abortion and divorce.110 The autonomy fostered
by abortion rights in privacy and choice to one marriage partner
unilaterally creates a wedge in the notion of marital oneness.111
That separation serves to weaken the marital bond. Roe opened
up options that altered how couples deal with the choice to
become a parent. They do not have to face abortion together;
parental choice to abort a child rests with one individual, a fact

109. Helen M. Alvaré, The Turn Toward the Self in the Law of Marriage &
Family: Same-Sex Marriage & Its Predecessors, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 135,
136 (2005). Professor Alvaré makes this point even more clearly in the larger
context of family law:
[M]arriage is not a tool for adults to feel better about being different,
but an important element to express state interests in the well-being
of children. Parents’ interests are not unimportant; marital happiness
is a terribly important component of adult happiness. Yet in the eyes
and on the scales of the law, the state is more vigorously protective of
children’s interests and looks to strong marital unions as the way of
assuring these. This is why the state can interfere with parents in
cases of child abuse, why divorcing parties may never have the last
word about child support or custody, why adoption procedures attend
so much more closely to the interests of the child than even the
deepest longings of would-be parents, and why recent federal and
state lawmaking efforts about marriage, divorce, and welfare all have
children as their rallying cry.
Id. at 187.
110. Others have connected abortion and divorce before with liberty
jurisprudence and family outcomes. See generally, e.g., JENNIFER E. SPRENG,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE LAW IN IRELAND (2004) (examining the history of both
laws in Ireland and their connections to community and family dynamics).
111. Professor Bruce C. Hafen examines the dynamics of abortion (and
contraception) in the context of marriage in his article, The Constitutional
Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and
Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 527−38 (1983) (discussing the competing
interests of each in family law).
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that is not conducive to marital unity.112 This works to expand
the wedge into marital oneness. Combined with the unilateral
choice to dissolve marriage, the unilateral nature of abortion has
the potential to severely weaken the moral fiber of marriage,
which might thereby increase the possibility of divorce.113
Marriage has also been altered by the concept of privacy as
developed through case law, including Roe. Efforts toward
expanding marriage’s definition and the type of unions afforded
state recognition have been altered in that rather than
recognizing conjugal114 marriage alone, several states have moved
to expand marriage toward non-conjugal variations.115 The most
112. On the other hand, some might suggest that an abortion could promote
marriage, as was the case with one high-profile couple. While not wishing to
promote abortion, a joint decision for abortion between cohabitants led to
marriage for NBA player Udonis Haslem and Faith Rein. See Linda Marx,
Taking Their Very Sweet Time, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/fashion/weddings/taking-their-very-sweet-time.ht
ml (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (describing Rein’s decision to get an abortion as a
positive turning point in their relationship) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). But compare that to NBA star J.J. Redick, who contracted
with his girlfriend for an abortion. See Barry Petchesky, How J.J. Redick’s
Abortion Contract Was Conceived, DEADSPIN (Jul. 25, 2013, 4:20 PM),
http://deadspin.com/how-j-j-redicks-abortion-contract-was-conceived-9127 27291
(last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (detailing an agreement between Redick and his
girlfriend that was premised on her getting an abortion) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. For a clinical look at the effect of abortion on troubled marriages, see
generally J. Mattison, The Effects of Abortion on Marriage, in ABORTION:
MEDICAL PROGRESS AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS, CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM 115
(1985) (examining clinical aspects of an abortion’s effects on the marriage
partners and on their marriage in the context of couples turning to therapy who
find they may not have understood at the time of the abortion the effects it
would have on them and their marriage later).
114. “Conjugal” defines those rights shared specifically by a wife and a
husband, and include the enjoyment of each other’s society, intimacy, comfort,
and affections, also generally referring to sexual intimacy between a married
man and woman. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (9th ed. 2009) (“Of or
relating to the married state, often with an implied emphasis on sexual
relations between spouses . . . .”). The term is used as a primary indicator of
marriage by Girgis, Anderson, and George to describe a marriage of a man and a
woman as contrasted to a same-sex marriage. See SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T.
ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A
DEFENSE 1–2, 9, 23, 37 (2012) (describing the conjugal view of marriage “as an
emotional and spiritual bond, distinguished thus by its comprehensiveness . . . ”
and comparing “conjugal” male–female marriage to “revisionist” same-sex
marriage throughout).
115. See Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, LAMBDA LEGAL (July
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recent Supreme Court opinion on spousal relationships discussed
only same-sex marriage.116 The movement toward marriage
expansion and away from the conjugal definition of marriage has
been largely based on notions of privacy and autonomy,
jurisprudential rationales introduced into family law and welldeveloped in Roe.117 The constitutional foundation for privacy was
established in Griswold v. Connecticut,118 a case protecting
marital privacy for contraceptive use as a liberty interest of the
married couple.119 The marital context was abandoned, however,
in affording that same privacy interest to unmarried persons in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.120 That ruling served to distance marriage
from sexual intimacy, and that privacy rationale became the
foundation for Roe.121 This creates some correlation between Roe
and the separation of sexual intimacy from marriage.
The effects of Roe on marriage have worked to help turn
marriage into an institution that reflects more individualism
15, 2010) (last updated Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/
nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (listing the
states in various categories of same-sex marriage status) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Same-sex marriage has been legalized in
sixteen states—California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington—as well as the
District of Columbia. Id. Same-sex civil unions have become legislatively
equivalent to marriage in four additional states: Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, and
Oregon. Id.
116. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013)
(determining that animus was the major factor in limiting marriage to opposite
sex couples and that the limitation was therefore unconstitutional as a federal
definition of marriage).
117. See Elizabeth Oklevitch & Lynne Marie Kohm, Federalism or Extreme
Makeover of State Domestic Relations Power: The Rules and Rhetoric of Windsor
and Perry, 6 ELON L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
118. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
119. See id. at 485–86 (invalidating the Connecticut law banning the use of
contraceptives).
120. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court held that the
Massachusetts law under consideration, “by providing dissimilar treatment for
married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated . . . violate[ed] the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 454–455. Also, see Lynne Marie Kohm, From
Eisenstadt to Plan B: A Discussion of Conscientious Objections to Emergency
Contraception, 33 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 787 (2007), for further discussion of
the marital privacy implications of Eisenstadt.
121. See infra Part III for further discussion on this jurisprudence.
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than unity of two people into a new community. For many
centuries marriage was about bridging families, but “[t]oday, we
see marriage as a commitment between two individuals.”122
Western
culture
has
become
“individualistic,
prizing
independence and self-fulfillment in almost all areas. We
emphasize rights over duties and choice over obligation. This
extends especially to marriage.”123
The availability of abortion since Roe has also led to other
trends in marriage, cohabitation, and divorce. The link between
premarital sex and divorce has been highlighted by the
availability of abortion.124 Although there are signs that some
abstinence programs are increasingly tying marital happiness to
premarital sexual behaviors,125 the availability of abortion as a
contraceptive option has made premarital sex casual and easy,
making cohabitation preferable to marriage,126 simultaneously
122. MEG JAY, THE DEFINING DECADE: WHY YOUR TWENTIES MATTER—AND
HOW TO MAKE THE MOST OF THEM NOW 87 (2012).
123. Id. Dr. Jay continues:
With some notable exceptions, there has never been more freedom to
decide whether, when, and how to partner, and with whom. There is
no question that this has led to countless happy unions, as well as the
experience of owning one of the most important decisions of our lives.
At the same time, the foregrounding of the individual in the
relationships has caused us to forget about one of our greatest
twentysomething opportunities: picking and creating our families.
Id. at 87–88.
124. See Alvaré, supra note 36, at 31 (discussing the connection between
abortion availability and premarital sex, and suggesting it is a piece of the
divorce puzzle). Further empirical research in this area could inform the
argument of whether abortion leads to divorce.
125. Id. at 53. “The influential Abstinence Clearinghouse directs its many
members and visitors to its sophisticated website with a resource entitled
‘Saving Sex for Marriage Reduces the Risk of Divorce.’” Id.
126. See JAY, supra note 122, at 89–91 (discussing the “cohabitation effect”).
One woman said about cohabitation: “I felt like I was on this multiyear, neverending audition to be his wife. That made me really insecure. There was a lot of
game-playing and arguing.” Id. at 94. Jay’s research found a unique set of
circumstances surrounding cohabitation.
Cohabitation in the United States has increased more than 1,500
percent in the past fifty years. . . . This shift has largely been
attributed to the sexual revolution and the availability of birth
control, and certainly the economics of young adulthood play a role.
But when you talk to twentysomethings themselves, you hear about
something else: cohabitation as prophylaxis.
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weakening the moral fiber of marriage, and robbing women of the
marriage preference. “In gaining the option of abortion, many
women have lost the option of marriage.”127 Roe has had some
significant effects on the spousal relationship, altering marriage,
divorce, and marital relationships generally in ways that will
likely become more apparent in the future.
IV. Roe’s Effects on Sexuality, Romance, and the Family Generally
Roe has also brought dramatic changes to relationships
between men and women. Sexuality and privacy notions in family
law have been expanded and modified in many ways because of
the constitutional privacy that was developed in Roe.128 When Roe
came to the Court in 1973, the previous decisions of Griswold and
Eisenstadt provided easy application of privacy, combined with
jurisprudence on autonomy, to make the way for a woman’s
decision regarding pregnancy termination, though essentially
derived from the penumbra of the Constitution.129 The Court’s
ruling on sex between consenting partners in Bowers v.
Hardwick130 was overruled as unconstitutional jurisprudence in
Lawrence v. Texas based on Roe-like privacy notions.131 The
privacy basis of Roe formed the foundation for new law on
consensual sex between adults brought to bear in Lawrence.132
Id. at 91.
127. Richard Stith, Her Choice, Her Problem, FIRST THINGS,
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/07/her-choice-her-problem (last visited
Mar. 2, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Stith
completes the thought: “Liberal abortion laws have thus considerably increased
the number of families headed by a single mother, resulting in what some
economists call the ‘feminization of poverty.’” Id.
128. Supra Part III.
129. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, passim (1973) (citing Griswold and
Eisenstadt throughout the opinion).
130. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Lawrence, the Court stated that the “petitioners
are entitled to respect for their private lives. . . . Their right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government” and “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual.” Id. at 578.
131. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
132. See id. at 565–66 (discussing Roe’s place in the development of privacy
jurisprudence).
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Combined with state decisions to protect unmarried partners,133
family law became permanently expanded to include
relationships between unmarried members.134
Somewhat surprisingly, some gender disparity in sexual
freedom has arisen as a result of this jurisprudential progression
of privacy. Some men have advocated for a paternal rights
exception to the abortion right.135 Because abortion gives women
more power to decide whether to procreate, some argue that men
should possess some rights in balance of that choice; for example,
a father might be afforded the right to decide previability to avoid
parenthood, or agree to solely parent the child if the woman gives
birth.136 A man could be continually promiscuous and neglect
birth control because of abortion availability; this entails less
cultural pressure for a man to show commitment to a woman
following sex when the man can rightly say that she can readily
terminate any resulting pregnancy. Some have argued that
“emotional and psychological harm results in the infringement of
the father’s constitutional right to privacy in procreative
matters.”137 This passive and expressive gender inequality has
come about because of Roe. Gender equality could be restored
post-Roe by holding a man financially responsible for a child if it
is presumed that he intended to father the child, such as when
the child was conceived within a formal or common law marriage,
or pursuant to a written contract.138
133. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122–23 (Cal. 1976) (finding in
quantum meruit an equitable remedy for dissolution of unmarried
partnerships).
134. See BRIAN BIX, FAMILY LAW 52 (2013) (discussing claims of unmarried
partners based on cohabitation relationships). Although Marvin’s rationale was
not based on family law regulations, its contract basis has become part of family
law for the dissolution of relationships between unmarried partners. Id.
135. See Mary A. Totz, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander:
Toward Recognition of Men’s Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 197
(1994) (proposing multiple approaches for men asserting paternal rights in the
abortion decision).
136. Id. at 147 (noting that the legal system has not yet recognized that a
man’s constitutional right to decide whether to beget a child should extend to
procreative decisions made during pregnancy).
137. Christopher Bruno, A Right to Decide Not to Be a Legal Father:
Gonzales v. Carhart and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a
Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 142 (2008).
138. See Totz, supra note 135, at 153 (proposing standards for a man’s
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Courts have repeatedly ruled that if a child is born to an
unmarried woman, the parents cannot contract to waive the
man’s child support obligation, as such agreements are against
public policy and void.139 Nevertheless, while denying men the
right to act between the time of conception and viability to avoid
the responsibilities accompanying procreation, courts have
consistently upheld the right on behalf of women, ruling that a
woman’s constitutional right to abort her child prior to viability is
one she may exercise unilaterally, even if she is married.140 An
argument can be made that these legal decisions infringe the
man’s fundamental rights.141 “[T]he government’s requirement
that a man pay mandatory child support for children he did not
choose to beget, while only requiring a woman to financially
support those children she actually decides to bear, . . . plac[es]
an unequal statutory burden upon a man who desired not to
procreate.”142 This argument would seem to make sense in light of
contemporary thought tending to eliminate the complementary
nature of gender.143 If gender is no longer binary, it would seem
financial responsibility for a child). Conversely, “a man should not be fiscally
responsible to provide child support if he was single and the conception was
unintended or the result of a birth control mishap—one of the main rationales
for a woman’s abortion right.” Id.
139. See id. at 158 (noting that this situation occurs more often when state
social service agencies sue for child support on behalf of a child) (citing Okla.
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla. 1993)).
140. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)
(invalidating Pennsylvania’s spousal notification law).
141. See Totz, supra note 135, at 158 (arguing that voiding agreements to
waive child support and spousal notification laws amounts to an intrusion on
“the man’s fundamental rights”).
142. Id. at 173−74.
One proposed method of protecting a man’s right to avoid procreation
is for the state to require a pregnant single woman who will be
seeking child support to, sometime prior to viability, notify the
putative father of her intent to carry the pregnancy to full-term.
Upon notice, the father could decide whether or not he also wishes to
beget the child.
Id. at 177.
143. See, e.g., KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 871 (1993) (explaining that gender is a social construct dependent
upon subjective individual perspective). For a discussion of that theory in a
different context of gender equality see Lynne Marie Kohm, A Christian
Perspective on Gender Equality, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 339, 341 (2008).
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that the unequal treatment of two people similarly situated as
parents promotes a violation of equal protection.144
Placing Roe in a broader social framework illuminates the
individual rights perspectives of sexual relationships that find
themselves governed by family law. Some scholars examine “the
Roe decision and its progeny from an individual rights
perspective of both sexes,” specifically challenging Roe “in an
[e]qual [p]rotection context.”145 There are several proposed
solutions to the current inequities in reproductive rights,
responsibilities, and decision-making between the sexes.146 One
proposed solution is a “symbolic abortion” by men: “The father-tobe would reserve the right to refuse support for the child. The
father-to-be could simply abort himself from the situation by
stating that he has no interest in the child-to-be, for whatever
reason, and thus will not support the child.”147 Evident once more
are the (un)fairness arguments that men are legally powerless in
the abortion decision but financially responsible for unwanted
children.148 The growing concerns of unwed and unintentional
fathers are taken up in father’s rights advocacy.149
144. See Totz, supra note 135, at 182–83 (arguing that the man “should have
an equal say as to whether or not fetal development will continue”).
One of the inherent paradoxes of a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy, is that in protecting the individual privacy of a woman
from government intrusion, and by allowing her to make the ultimate
decision of whether or not to bear a child, the Supreme Court has
effectively intruded into the man’s fundamental right to decide
whether or not he will beget a child.
Id. (citation omitted).
145. Illya D. Lichtenberg & Jack Baldwin LeClair, Advocating Equal
Protection for Men in Reproductive Rights and Responsibilities, 38 S.U. L. REV.
53, 53–54 (2010).
146. See id. at 73–74 (discussing the disparate rights and responsibilities of
men and women when it comes to reproduction, and proposing solutions).
147. Id. at 75.
148. See id. at 63−67 (noting that although there is now no cultural stigma
of unwed motherhood, there is still the strong stigma of a “dead beat dad”).
149. See Bryn Anne Poland, He Said, She Said: Diverging Views in the
Emerging Field of Fathers’ Rights, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 163, 163–64 (2006) (noting
the growth of fathers’ rights advocacy groups). Unwed fathers are using these
historic cases to argue for more parental rights prior to the birth of a child.
Potential fathers are aligning themselves on both sides of the debate; some
attempt to use Roe v. Wade to terminate their parental responsibilities, while
others attempt to use their status as a potential parent under the Fourteenth
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Some unwed fathers have attempted to sue the women they
have impregnated for fraud,150 the theory being that “[a]lthough a
suit for fraud against a mother would not terminate a father’s
parental responsibilities, men who successfully pursued tort
claims for fraud could theoretically use the money damages from
the claim to meet those parental responsibilities.”151 These cases
do not provide a consistent approach and the fraud claims
typically have been unsuccessful,152 but they nonetheless reveal
the alteration to gender relations and gender roles that has
occurred since and as a consequence of Roe. On the other hand,
some potential fathers have sought a permanent injunction
prohibiting the mother from receiving an abortion.153 So far,
autonomy and privacy have trumped this approach based on the
fact that a child is conceived and grows inside a woman’s body.
Men have also argued for their rights using the tort of
conversion as a way to provide compensation for the loss of a
child when a mother receives an abortion against the wishes of
the potential father.154 Almost as if to revive the old doctrines of
parental ownership of a child as his or her property, some men
argue that although a fetus is not considered a person with
constitutional rights until months after conception, a father
retains a property interest in the fetus from the moment of
conception.155 By aborting a fetus, the mother has converted the
potential father’s property interest, and he should be allowed to

Amendment to prohibit a pregnant woman from terminating her pregnancy. Id.
at 164.
150. Id. at 170 (citing In re Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982)). Poland adopts a definition of fraud as “an intentional,
knowing misrepresentation, reliance upon which causes another person injury.”
Id. (citation omitted). She asserts that the fraud claim would be “based on the
‘injury’ of the father being forced into paying child support.” Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner’s Tort Liability
to Other Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of
Birth Control Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301 (1992) (focusing on tort
claims of fraud and misrepresentation).
153. Poland, supra note 149, at 170–71.
154. See Totz, supra note 135, at 225–26 (outlining the theory behind a
conversion action).
155. See id. (relying on rationale from in-vitro fertilization cases to assert
that the fetus is the parents’ property).
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pursue monetary damages against the mother.156 Cultural conflict
in the areas of sexuality are observable broadly in culture157 and
are inevitably reflected in relationships between men and women;
these conflicts are in greater and more direct divergence because
of Roe and the abortion option, and the major dynamics of
sexuality that have been altered as a result.
Women’s rights, though thought by many to be dependent on
reproductive choice,158 have been limited by Roe. That fact has
been argued by feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon in her
critique of Roe’s extension of the privacy right to abortion.159 She
posits that abortion does not afford women more authority over
sexual activity or reproductive choice, but rather that “[a]bortion
facilitates women’s heterosexual availability.”160 “Assuming that
the feminist analysis of sexuality is [an] analysis of gender
inequality,” MacKinnon argues that “abortion is inextricable from
sexuality.”161 Reasoning that the arguments of both pro-choice
and pro-life positions assume that women control sex, MacKinnon
asserts that feminist investigations prove otherwise, and that
156. See id. at 226 (describing the potential father’s property interest as a
future interest).
157. See generally STEVEN SEIDMAN, EMBATTLED EROS: SEXUAL POLITICS AND
ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1992). This author presents a sophisticated
analysis of the major dynamics and patterns of the contemporary debate on
sexuality as two sexual ideologies: the libertarian—where sex has no moral
connection—and the romanticist—where sex is about romance and morality,
including abortion. Id. at 5–7. He suggests a pragmatic sexual ethic of sexual
and social responsibility as a bridge between libertarians and romanticists,
arguing that mutual consent cannot provide the only basis for limiting sexual
expression, but that a sexual ethic should take account of the qualitative aspects
of sexual and social change. Id. at 206–07. He notes that in the 1990s Americans
were divided on virtually every issue surrounding sexuality; now, however,
though the sexual sphere is so entangled that it defies both description and
analysis, he seems able to clarify some of the major dynamics, conflicts, and
patterns of contemporary American intimate culture. Id. at 211–14.
158. See Lynne Marie Kohm, The Challenges of Teaching Gender Equality in
an Age of Gendercide, 6 REGENT J.L. PUB. POL’Y 1, 20–23 (2013) (discussing the
notion promoted in nearly all of legal education and feminist jurisprudence that
women’s rights rest on the abortion foundation) (manuscript on file with the
author).
159. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 107, at 102 (asserting that
“[w]hen women are segregated in private separated from each other, . . . a right
to privacy isolates us at once from each other and from public recourse”).
160. Id. at 99.
161. Id. at 93.
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women do not control sex.162 While contraception would be a
better choice for a woman who wants to avert an abortion,
“[n]orms of sexual rhythm and romance that are felt interrupted
by women’s needs are constructed against women’s interests.”163
MacKinnon notes that courts use the privacy rubric to connect
contraception and abortion to promote an increasing freedom for
women from government intrusion,164 but under current
conditions of gender inequality, however, sexual liberation does
not free women. Rather “[t]he availability of abortion removes the
one remaining legitimized reason that women have had for
refusing sex besides the headache.”165
In this way abortion alters a woman’s bargaining power in
romance and sexuality. “Legalized abortion was supposed to
grant enormous freedom to women, but it has had the perverse
result of freeing men and trapping women.”166 Because “[e]asy
access to abortion has increased the expectation and frequency of
sexual intercourse . . . among young people, it is more difficult for
a woman to deny herself to a man without losing him,”167 as the
“presence in the sexual marketplace of women willing to have an
abortion reduces an individual woman’s bargaining power.”168
162. See id. at 94–95 (“Feminism has found that women feel compelled to
preserve the appearance—which acted upon, becomes the reality—of male
direction of sexual expression . . . .”)
163. Id. at 95 (discussing a woman’s need to interrupt a romantic interlude
to prepare for protected sex that would help to avoid an abortion in the context
of the pressures not to do so because she does not control the sex).
164. See id. at 96 (citing Roe, and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), as
two Supreme Court cases delineating the limits on the government’s duties not
to intervene and to intervene in a woman’s decision whether to terminate her
pregnancy).
165. Id. at 99.
166. Stith, supra note 127. Stith credits radical feminist Catherine
MacKinnon’s prescience on the effects of Roe as a decision that would largely
benefit men, stating the “‘men control sexuality’ and ‘Roe does not contradict
this.’” Id. Stith writes,
Perhaps that is why, she observed, “the Playboy Foundation has
supported abortion rights from day one.” In the end, MacKinnon
pronounced, Roe’s “right to privacy looks like an injury got up as a
gift,” for “virtually every ounce of control that women won” from
legalized abortion “has gone directly into the hands of men.”
Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Stith notes that an economic environment that “employs mainly
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Therefore, the availability of abortion has led to a casual sexual
culture, as abortion as a method of birth control has eliminated a
potential natural consequence of premarital sex. Abortion, then,
makes possible casual sexual attitudes characterized in a hookup
culture.
This casual sexual culture has become the focus of some
interesting research. In her book Sex and the Soul169 on the
intersection of faith and sexual experiences of college students,
Donna Freitas discusses the problems created by casual sexual
values. “The problem was that the hookup culture promoted
reckless, unthinking attitudes and expectations about sex,
divorcing it from their larger value commitments—religious,
spiritual, or otherwise.”170 Although Freitas never explicitly
considers abortion, her research deals in particularity with the
casual sexual culture college students are faced with today. She
reports that the students she interviewed were weary and
fatigued by their sexual experiences. “After a few years of living
in this environment they felt exhausted, spent, emptied by the
pressure to participate in encounters that left them
unfulfilled.”171 This pressure Freitas refers to, though experienced
by both male and female students in her study,172 seems to
provide an example of the lack of power MacKinnon observes in
the notion that women are unable to control sex.173 Freitas was
surprised by her findings, particularly of disempowerment.
men, leaving women dependent on economic handouts,” creates an environment
in which “women will be much less likely to resist male pressures to make use of
abortion. Wherever men make women’s decisions for them, the option of
abortion will be a man’s choice, regardless of how the law may label it.” Id. at 8.
169. DONNA FREITAS, SEX AND THE SOUL: JUGGLING SEXUALITY, SPIRITUALITY,
ROMANCE, AND RELIGION ON CAMPUS xv (Oxford U. Press 2008).
170. Id. at xv. Some of those value commitments were expressed through
child-bearing secured by marriage (although it should be noted that Freitas
characterizes her students’ attitudes toward a procreation-only view of sex and
marriage as “outdated” and “unrealistic,” id. at 196). See Stith, supra note 127
(discussing the duty a man understood in offering marriage to a woman in the
event of pregnancy prior to Roe).
171. FREITAS, supra note 169, at xv.
172. Freitas’ study used a sample of twenty women and one man; it also
touches on hookup remorse from male students as well. Id. at 153.
173. See MacKinnon, supra note 107, at 93–99 (describing the further
gender disempowerment that abortion promotes and arguing that “women do
not control access to [their] sexuality”).
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At first, I was taken aback by students’ stories about the party
scene and the degrading experiences that many of them,
especially the women, endured regularly. We are ostensibly
living in the era of feminism and post-sexual revolution.
Weren’t my students supposed to be beneficiaries of these
movements, empowered and in control of their sexuality? I was
even more surprised to learn exactly how powerless they felt to
change this culture that made them so unhappyat least
before they realized that the person next to them (and the
person next to that person) wished she or he could change
things, too.174

Because women have the right to an abortion, sexual
intercourse and the choice to abort in the event of pregnancy can
be often presumed. Clark Forsythe, Senior Counsel for Americans
United for Life, argues that Roe has not solved the problems it
was supposed to solve for women.175 He argues that the
availability of abortion has not reduced spousal abuse176 or
poverty for women,177 nor provided better job opportunities
necessarily.178 Rather, the paradigm of liberty and control has
essentially magnified the power of uncommitted men,
“leverag[ing] male influence over women and damag[ing] male–
female relationships.”179 Furthermore, abortion has provided a
way, unwittingly, for women to annihilate the future of their own
gender in rampant gendercide occurring in nations around the
world.180 Family law is largely designed to provide for the
174. FREITAS, supra note 169, at xviii.
175. CLARK FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V.
WADE 310−11 (2013).
176. See id. at 323 (“Whatever the risk of spousal abuse in 1973, the risk for
women has been replaced by increasing rates of domestic abuse of women—by
uncommitted men.”). “Numerous incidents have been publicized where men
assault women for not having an abortion; and data suggest that these incidents
are not rare.” Id. at 323–24.
177. See id. at 316 (comparing poverty rates in families with married
couples to poverty rates in “female-headed families with children”).
178. See id. at 316–18 (discussing employment opportunity for women since
Roe).
179. Id. at 321. Forsythe has also argued that the pro-life community bears
the burden of civility in the abortion debate. For a review of that work, see
Lynne Marie Kohm, Restoring the Lost Virtue of Prudential Justice to the Life
Debate, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 191 (2009).
180. See Kohm, supra note 117 (noting the gender imbalances in major
world nations revealing the vast annihilation of baby girls by reproductive
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protection of vulnerable family members; those members are
most often women and children. Some of these effects might not
technically be characterized as impacts upon family law, but their
effects are nonetheless detrimental to women, which has an
indirect effect on the strength of family law regulations designed
to protect women.
Roe has also been a factor in the breakdown of romance. The
availability of abortion created a disconnect between sexual
intercourse and procreation, removing or causing to disappear a
level of sexual caution that dating relationships generally benefit
from in terms of emotional protection.181 While not addressing
abortion, Dr. Meg Jay speaks candidly and caringly to young men
and women on their choices in dating, cohabitation, marriage,
and becoming parents, particularly describing the problems
presented by managing sexuality and fertility.182 Jay posits that
young women and men have been made more vulnerable in a
variety of ways due to the many options for sexual intimacy now
available to them.183 Romance is sometimes lost in a culture of
sexual expectations, 184 which may sometimes leave the parties
emotionally harmed.185 Those expectations of immediate intimacy
technology and choice).
181. See FREITAS, supra note 169, at 93–97 (discussing the benefits of
romance and emotional closeness in sexual encounters).
182. See JAY, supra note 122, at 69–79 (describing the experiences and
problems of numerous twenty-something men and women). Jay quotes feminist
theorist Germaine Greer: “The management of fertility is one of the most
important functions of adulthood.” Id. at 175.
183. See id. at 75–79 (noting that men and women cohabitate for many
reasons, some of which include economy, convenience, and sexual intimacy).
However, “[l]iving with someone may have benefits, but approximating
marriage is not necessarily one of them,” as many cohabitants do so for fun,
rather than for added responsibility. Id. at 89–95.
184. See, e.g., Jeremy Nicholson, Unrealistic Relationship Expectations:
Learning from Don Jon, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.
psychologytoday.com/blog/the-attraction-doctor/201309/unrealistic-relationshipexpectations-learning-don-jon (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (discussing sexual
expectations in the context of media portrayals) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
185. Elizabeth Armstrong, Laura Hamilton & Paula England, Is Hooking
Up Bad for Women?, CONTEXTS (Aug. 2010), http://contexts.org/articles/summer2010/is-hooking-up-bad-for-young-women/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2014)
(discussing the empirical evidence of the dangers and benefits of casual sex for
women) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). While the authors
note that “[t]he most commonly encountered disadvantage of hookups . . . is that
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are made more possible by the availability and opportunity to
remove an unwanted pregnancy.186 The result is that rather than
enjoying reproductive freedom, women have been disadvantaged
by the negative effect of Roe on what used to be romantic
attachments, thereby placing women at a disadvantage in terms
of relational issues.187 Sexual liberty, postmodern sexual freedom,
and the hookup culture have not necessarily supported women or
their exercise of their rights as women.188 Roe allowed abortion to
become a backstop for failed contraception, which had the
unintended consequence of facilitating the sexual exploitation of
women and resulting in increased rates of unintended pregnancy
and abortion.189
sex in relationships is far better for women” the authors also list a number of
advantages of casual sex that some women have reported: that boyfriends tend
to get in the way of their studies and the fact that they do not have to expend
emotional energy that might otherwise be required for a relationship. Id.
186. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion
Legalization on Sexual Behavior, 32 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 407, 430−32 (2003)
(examining how easy access to abortion increased the expectation and frequency
of sexual intercourse, as well as increased pregnancies and sexually transmitted
infections).
187. Stith points this out in the context of marital expectations in a
relationship:
Prior to the legalization of abortion in the United States, it was
commonly understood that a man should offer a woman marriage in
case of pregnancy, and many did so. But with the legalization of
abortion, men started to feel that they were not responsible for the
birth of children and consequently not under any obligation to marry.
In gaining the option of abortion, many women have lost the option of
marriage.
Stith, supra note 127, at 9.
188. Stith strongly asserts that abortion availability leaves the woman as
the only responsible party, as “the father and the doctor and the healthinsurance actuary can point a finger at her as the person” responsible for “an
inconvenient human being;” and that abortion availability “makes women’s
claims for better working conditions lose a measure of legitimacy.” Id. at 10. Jay
is subtler in her approach to empowerment, discussing dating, cohabitation,
“dating down,” and the timing of choosing a marriage partner in a culture of
casual intimacy. See JAY, supra note 122, at 93.
189. See E-mail from Dorinda Bordlee, Vice President & Chief Counsel of
the Bioethics Def. Fund, to author (Jun. 17, 2013, 3:46 PM) (noting that “Roe
and Casey embodied a flawed radical feminist philosophy that made abortion a
backstop for failed contraception—which had the unintended consequence of
facilitating the sexual exploitation of women and resulting in increased rates of
unintended pregnancy and abortion.”) (on file with author). This idea originated
with Dorinda Bordlee. Though it was not possible for her to participate in this
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Women are also compromised in their relationships with men
by their own acquiescence to arguments made by a lover based on
the availability of abortion.190 Because a woman can get an
abortion, it can be assumed by a lover that she will do so to keep
the relationship free of responsibility. “Children were the tangible
proof of romance; evidence of the success, even moral correctness,
of romantic love. But abortion breaks the age old connections
between love, sex, marriage, and procreation; it does so, both
actually and in the stories we tell.”191 Romantic relationships
have, as a direct result of abortion availability, become more
sexually focused in culture generally.192 Abortion “throws new
narrative twists into our stories of love, exposing uncertainties
that have been in our most intimate relationships all along”
193but now those uncertainties highlight sexual intimacy
without consequence (other than possible physical evidence and
emotional sting).194 The realities of life post-Roe impact women
negatively and can be factors that might keep a woman from
pursuing legal action against a man that has fathered her
child.195 Roe’s effects on sexuality and intimate partner
Symposium, Bordlee’s initial work focused more generally upon Roe’s harmful
impact upon women. But cf. Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional
Conflict and the Spread of Woman Protective Anti-Abortion Arguments, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1641, 1688–90 (2008) (objecting to arguments and policies that claim
abortion harms women, and labeling them as “gender-paternalist”).
190. See Stith, supra note 127, at 8 (“To the degree that a culture is built on
machismo, for example, the legalization of abortion will make women relatively
worse off by giving men another tool to manipulate women as sex objects.”).
191. CARA J. MARIANNA, ABORTION: A COLLECTIVE STORY 53 (2002).
192. See Stith, supra note 127, at 7 (“Easy access to abortion has increased
the expectation and frequency of sexual intercourse (including unprotected
intercourse) among young people, making it more difficult for a woman to deny
herself to a man without losing him, thus increasing pregnancies and sexually
transmitted infections.” (citing Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect
of Abortion Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407 (2003))).
193. MARIANNA, supra note 191, at 53.
194. See id. at 52–53 (discussing the story of one woman who states that she
fell in love three times and each time got pregnant as proof of the love affair, so
to speak, yet obtained an abortion because the relationships did not last).
195. See Serrin M. Foster, What If Her Partner, Friends, or Family Have
Abandoned Her? Or What If She Is Poor?, HUMAN LIFE OF WASH.,
http://www.humanlife.net/view_qnr.htm?qid= 16 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014)
(“Lack of support often coerces women into abortion.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Stith, supra note 127, at 8 (discussing how
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jurisprudence have affected and potentially injured relational
aspects between men and women.196 Sexuality and privacy
notions in family law have been expanded and modified because
of the foundation for constitutional privacy that was developed in
Roe and is widely applied to male–female relationships generally.
Changes to family law generally brought about by Roe have
also affected the family as an institution. The combination of
legal changes from Roe in the parent–child relationship, the
spousal relationship, and sexual relationships between men and
women in law and culture have led to a more individual-focused
legal environment in a family context. “Our American culture is
experiencing later marriages, historically low birthrates, high
abortion rates, 400,000 ‘frozen embryos’ in storage, and record
creation of more or less temporary sexual unions resulting in high
numbers of children at risk for the difficulties that arise in oneparent homes.”197 Roe’s effect on laws concerning contraception
and abortion, and particularly regarding minors’ access to
contraception and abortion, has clearly sent messages about the
role of sex in the lives of adolescents198 and adults, and has
assisted in moving family law toward a set of protections of
individual interests, rather than a code that protects and
strengthens families. That has had an impact on family strength,
weakening the unit generally.
Roe has led to a host of incidental effects on the family. It has
served to increase government involvement in the family, as
abortion funding is now a routine part of federal family
refusing to have an abortion may leave a woman all alone with the burden of a
child, and society supposing she has no one to blame but herself for not making
the abortion decision).
196. See, e.g., Feminists for Life America, Print Advertisement (2003)
(saying “If SHE’s in trouble, HE’s in trouble, too” to inform women about child
support laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Ziegler,
Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life
Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232 (2013) (discussing different
positions on abortion held by pro-life feminists in an effort to identify areas of
agreement with pro-choice feminists).
197. Alvaré, supra note 109, at 18. Professor Alvaré continues: “There is also
the fact of endless media images celebrating unbridled adult sexual choices. In
sum, it is a culture in which human sexuality appears to be viewed through the
lens of adult desires, with the unwanted consequences of disease and pregnancy
spoken of in the same breath.” Id.
198. Id. at 47.
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assistance.199 Recent Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulations for the Affordable Care Act mandate that
contraception, sterilization, Plan B, Mifropristone, and other
nonsurgical pharmaceutical abortion medication be available and
paid for by employers,200 often regardless of an employer’s profamily faith perspectives.201 Roe has also propagated a method of
limiting families that has revealed its racial disparity.202 It has
also changed how family law is taught in legal education.203
Families and individuals can reconsider their family planning
strategy because of the possibility of abortion used as selective
pregnancy reduction in assisted reproduction techniques.204 It
could be argued that the value of a child individually and to his or
199. See Nat’l Network of Abortion Funds, Can Medicaid Cover My
http://www.fundabortionnow.org/getAbortion?,
FUND ABORTION NOW,
help/Medicaid (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (listing fifteen states as providing
abortion funding through Medicaid: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
200. See Preventive Services Covered Under the Affordable Care Act, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/
healthcare/facts/factsheets/2010/07/preventive-services-list.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2014) (listing contraception among the preventive services offered for
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her family has been permanently altered.205 Families have been
forever changed by Roe.
V. Conclusion
Roe has had a profound effect on family law. It has altered
the parent–child relationship and the spousal relationship. Its
ideology is connected or correlated to devalued marriage,
increased divorce, increased cohabitation, and a culture of casual
sexuality. It has changed relationships between men and women,
perhaps permanently, and led to unique harms to women and to
men.
Alterations to family law brought about by Roe comprise a
pattern of increasing individuality and a decreasing sense of
community, even between family members related by blood or
consanguinity. Forty years of some of the most profound changes
to family law have occurred since Roe v. Wade. While all those
changes may not necessarily be a direct result of that decision, a
significant amount of these changes are manifestly effects of Roe.
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